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ABSTRACT
Much demography is concerned with answering questions about when or what rather than
about why. We need to focus explicitly on processes. We should study becoming a parent
or parenthood, not births; partnership processes not marriages; health and well-being, not
deaths.
The other key shift of emphasis is to within-individual pathways. We must engage with
the biological sciences and learn from the approach of psychology. The interplays of
genes and their expression with the environment and of the neuroendocrine system with
behaviour will prove essential in understanding demographic behaviour.
Demography can transform to a generic social and behavioural science linked to the
biological sciences. We should emphasise frameworks and theories that can illuminate
the processes and pathways involved in demographic behaviour.
KEYWORDS: genetics, neuroscience, contexts, pathways, processes, theory, paradigms,
dynamics, new directions.Hobcraft 24/1/05 3
1. Prologue
Profound changes are needed in our approach to understanding demographic behaviour
and the consequences thereof. Currently the dominant analytic approaches in the study of
demographic behaviour and its consequences often rely on simple event history analysis
or an economics paradigm (e.g. two of three papers in a recent symposium on causality in
demography were essentially rooted in econometric models – see Moffitt 2003 and Smith
2003). Moreover, most work relies very heavily on secondary data sources that have not
been tailored to answering specific demographic questions (see McNicoll 1992 for
similar sentiments). The combination of these elements leads to a far too restrictive
approach to modelling, measurement, and theory. In this paper, I seek to identify healthy
trends that are already under way in broadening our compass and approach and to point
the way to further developments: a combination of evolution and revolution.
Demographic behaviour is at the core of human existence, being concerned with crucial
and intimate aspects of our lives. Understanding partnership, parenthood, well-being,
position in society and in space, and the family as a key nexus of caring, intimacy, and
commitment is the heartland of the determinants of demographic behaviour. The
ramifications of such behaviour for the ways our lives play out are the heartland of the
consequences of demographic behaviour. These are issues of profound importance and
deserve much greater attention.
We need to stop being accountants, who are predominantly interested in answering
questions about when events happen, rather than asking why behaviour occurs, or in
describing in much detail what happens, rather than addressing why things happen. The
use of the word pointlessness in the title reflects my concerns that we make demography
more pointless by becoming less obsessed with events (or point-occurrences), but a great
deal less pointless by concentrating on pathways, processes, and progressions. In order to
achieve this transformation, we need to place much greater emphasis on building and
developing mid-level theories (for useful and quite different takes on theory in
demography see Burch 1993, 1996, 2002 and 2003a and b, Massey et al 1993, Van de
Kaa 1996, and Lesthaeghe 1998).  Brass (1986) lauded demography for being ‘specific,
pedestrian and modest – underrated qualities in social science’ and, by implication saw
much social science as concerned with ‘the speculative, the diffuse, the ill-defined and
the pretentious’. In this paper I want to emphasize a third way for demography that might
be characterized as interdisciplinary, innovative, and focussed. To echo Hajnal (1955,
p.321) we need ‘less computation and more cogitation’, although there may be useful
insights from combining computation and cogitation (see Billari and Prskawetz 2003).
I argue that enhancing our understanding requires attention to pathways within the
person, to processes whereby the person interplays with their context or environment, and
to progressions through the life-course or over time, which involve the interplays of
pathways and processes. But I also emphasize that the distinction between pathways
within the person and processes outside the person is an expository convenience, since
the really interesting challenges and research agendas arise from the interplays andHobcraft 24/1/05 4
interactions among and within these domains. Pathways, processes and progressions as
organizing principles also indicate the departure from an event-oriented perspective.
Moreover, the rich tapestry of the interplays mandates that our understanding is
ultimately rooted in broad-ranging, large, and expensive prospective studies, though real
insights can be obtained along the way from small-scale, rigorous, prospective in-depth
studies, combining qualitative and quantitative elements, that may well be embedded in
the larger-scale endeavour. Much recent demographic research is using important
prospective studies to explore some of the pathways involved in demographic behaviour.
However, I believe that we have a long way to go in developing studies that are both
closely focussed on explaining particular aspects of demographic behaviour and
sufficiently broad and multi-disciplinary in their compass to enable us seriously to begin
discovering what really matters, and to start disentangling the mediating routes and
feedbacks in the pathways, processes and progressions involved.  In doing so, we shall
have to pay much closer attention to genetics, neuroscience, and psychology in
understanding the within-person pathways, as well as radically improving our theory,
conceptualisation, measurement, and subtlety in dealing with both inter-personal and
institutional contexts. Illustrations and justifications of the broad-ranging approach
needed are contained in the recent reviews of progress on child development (Shonkoff
and Phillips 2000), on health (Singer and Ryff 2001), and on fertility (Wachter and
Bulatao 2003).
Some of these concerns can be illustrated on a more modest scale through the work on
understanding parenthood that I have undertaken in part with Kathleen Kiernan. We
began by elaborating a mid-level conceptual framework, that addressed the range of
elements that need to be considered in trying to understand the process of becoming a
parent and applied this in a broad sweep to interpreting fertility trends and variations in
Western Europe (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995). Subsequently I used the same framework
in a more detailed consideration of fertility levels and trends for England and Wales
(Hobcraft 1996). A further step in the process was my attempt to elaborate the design
required for a much more focussed study of the transition to parenthood (Hobcraft 2002),
which has influenced but not determined the design of the more omnibus UNECE Gender
and Generations Survey. More recently, I began trying to elaborate some of the requisite
within-person pathways that need to be considered (Hobcraft 2003). This incomplete
endeavour, of course influenced and informed by the work of many others along the way,
is much needed in other areas of demographic behaviour. I might have used the range of
studies on ageing, which have been influenced by the US National Institute of Aging, as a
more elaborate and fully developed example if space had permitted.
In the space available I am only able to sketch some of the issues involved in how we
examine various aspects of demographic behaviour and its consequences. In doing so, I
focus initially on elements of demographic behaviour in turn and sketch some of the ways
in which pathways, processes, and progressions are essential to our understanding, whilst
emphasizing the need to move away from a narrow focus on symbolic events. Some of
the important issues and findings relating to genetics, neuroscience, and social science areHobcraft 24/1/05 5
then reviewed.  I then look at some of the lessons we can learn from other disciplines,
notably biology, psychology, and epidemiology, both about how to approach problems
and for what we can learn substantively. In doing so, I draw some contrasts with the
dominant economics (/sociology) rational choice paradigm and differences in
conceptualisation, measurement, and approach.
I then briefly consider some of the issues involved in and consequences for the design,
analysis, and interpretation of relevant research. Inevitably, given my broad compass,
much detail will be omitted. An important issue that I shall not discuss in detail concerns
the whole set of issues concerned with the ethics of research, especially on links between
genetics and behaviour. An excellent and extended treatment of these issues is provided
by Finch, Vaupel and Kinsella (2001) and a brief but valuable addendum by Rutter
(2003).
Finally, I shall take up the theme that demographers will increasingly have to work in
multidisciplinary teams in order to make serious progress in comprehending demographic
behaviour. I believe we are better placed than most social scientists for this endeavour for
a range reasons, including our history of being multidisciplinary and of engaging with the
biomedical and natural sciences.
2. Processes not Events
Most of my concerns in this article will be with individual-level behaviour, since I
passionately share the perspectives of Blalock and Wilken (1979) or of Coleman (1990)
that human behaviour involves individuals making choices (or not) influenced by their
own experiences and legacies and by interplay with other individuals, collectives, and
institutions. However, I shall elaborate reasons why it is no longer appropriate (if indeed
it ever was) to root understanding of human behaviour almost exclusively in a rational
choice framework.
But let us begin with a simple illustration of processes versus events at the macro-level.
Many commentators have deemed the outcome of the International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD) at Cairo in 1994 as a paradigm shift  towards a
rights-based reproductive health perspective. In some real sense Cairo was an important
event or marker, but few would dispute the interpretation that it was a significant part of
an ongoing process, with roots in the emergence of the women’s movement and in the
response to the funding crisis for family planning of the 1980s, and with the battles
between the proponents and opponents of the rights-based reproductive health approach
continuing today.
I now turn to a brief examination of why we should be concentrating on processes and
not just events for all research into understanding demographic behaviour. One goal is to
broaden the terrain that we consider, so that we can truly begin to address both the
determinants and consequences of demographic behaviour. I consciously take issue with
narrow conceptions of demography as being solely concerned with births, deaths and
migrations, since population size is often regarded as all that really matters. Such a viewHobcraft 24/1/05 6
often sees marriage or partnership as only being of relevance in the context of fertility. A
narrow concentration on events has certain analytic advantages, including ease of
measurement, convenience for analysis, and clarity of focus, but demography has reached
the limits of such essentially descriptive analysis and now needs to raise the bar towards
dealing with understanding of dynamic processes.
Although events such as marriages, births, or deaths are of importance in their own right
and often have important symbolic meanings, it is imperative that we recognize much
more clearly that these markers are by no means the only elements in changes of state or
status that are of profound importance for demographic behaviour, or have widely
differing consequences. The implications of parenthood alter with family size, ages of the
child, and in relation to a whole host of other factors. The shift to cohabitation or the
fuzzier shifts in time allocation, degree of autonomy, or levels of attachment in a
partnership are all of consequence both for partnership breakdown and for choices about
entry into parenthood or for child-rearing arrangements. Subtle shifts in health and well-
being status have important ramifications for living arrangements, employment, transfers
of time and money, and many other aspects of life. The process of deciding (or not) to
change place of residence (or job) is complex and involves many steps (or events) along
the way, but also interplays with many other important processes, both demographic and
other.
Recognition of these complexities not only poses formidable analytic challenges, but also
makes it much more necessary that we think more clearly about what are likely to be the
important factors involved in determining demographic behaviour or its consequences.
This requires greater conceptual clarity than is usual. We need to spend much more time
thinking through what may be the important connections across a wide range of
disciplinary perspectives and to pay much greater attention to issues of ‘causal ordering’
or mediating routes through the many elements involved. This involves clarification of
what may be the proximate real determinants, what may be the intermediate prior
antecedents, and so on backwards to possible ‘ultimate’ causes.
To give but one example in the realm of parenthood and its relationship to values,
attitudes, and ideas, it would seem highly plausible that those explicitly relating to
parenthood would be the most likely to be the most directly influential; a step backwards
might look at channels through world views or religiosity, and then there are more remote
questions as to how globalisation (or genes or evolution or neuroendocrine systems)
might act through these (and other) mediating routes. All are legitimate research
questions, but we have to begin to make much greater efforts to track though such chains
of influence. I believe that headway led by demographers will necessarily begin with the
proximate real determinants and gradually trace routes backwards (Hobcraft 2003).
But tracing the routes forwards is an equally important enterprise, perhaps led by those in
other disciplines, but where demographers should have important and influential inputs.
Even where we do not exert this influence, we nevertheless need to monitor and absorb
results from elsewhere and be equipped to critique and inform those who over interpret
their findings. It is interesting that a psychologist and a demographer quite independentlyHobcraft 24/1/05 7
chose the example of differing propensities for risk-taking behaviour as an illustrative
example of potentially important gene-brain-behaviour pathways for aspects of human
reproductive behaviour (Rutter 2003 and Hobcraft 2003). Both emphasised the multiple
and reinforcing effects that could arise for reproduction through the life-course.
Moreover, I shall argue that improvements in knowledge, measurement, and
understanding have increasingly made clear that most ‘events’ are relatively fuzzy and
very often part of more prolonged processes. One illustrative example is the study of
leaving the parental home, which began to receive serious attention during the 1980s
(Grebenik, Höhn and Mackensen 1989). It is clear that, for many families, the departure
of children is a very protracted process with complex and repeated departures and returns.
2.1 Partnership and intimacy not marriages and divorces
Demographers working on developed societies have been forced to abandon their focus
on formal marriage because of the rapid changes in partnership behaviour over the past
few decades. Our roots in civil or parish registration and simplistic questions in censuses
and surveys inhibited understanding. Those working on developing countries that lacked
registration systems had long been more aware of consensual unions and those working
in the Caribbean in particular had been aware of long-term visiting unions. Developed
country demographers have relabelled consensual unions as cohabitation and visiting
unions as ‘living apart together’ (LAT) or ‘romantically involved’ relationships
respectively. The meaning and nature of marriage has altered quite radically in much of
the world and is beginning to change in other areas.
But entry into partnerships has always been a process, with many steps along the way.
The locus of control in the process has often shifted away from parents, other relatives
and community leaders to the individuals concerned, but identification and sifting of
potentially suitable partners is an intrinsic part of the process, even where the couple first
meet at the time of the marriage. There are almost always clearly identifiable transitions
along the way, although the sequencing of attachment, sexual intercourse, living together
and any formal betrothal or marriage can vary significantly, with the latter elements
sometimes being optional. Yet these sequences surely have major implications for the
nature of the relationship. Contrast an arranged marriage, when the partners first meet at
the marriage and the bride moves to a distant village away from her friends and family,
with one where the couple have formed an ongoing attachment and sexual intimacy
before cohabiting and eventually decide to marry. Marriage in these two contexts does
not even have the same symbolic meaning, let alone being the same key event for
intimacy and reproduction. The partnership context of parenthood in this sequence can
also vary significantly and the desire to become a parent may play an important part in
decisions to cohabit or marry. Societal and gender structures clearly deeply affect the
nature of these processes and also partly determine the consequences of marriage for the
individuals concerned.
Many demographers are only interested in marriage because of its association with
reproduction. Yet marital status has surely always been a poor proxy for frequency ofHobcraft 24/1/05 8
sexual intercourse, which is the behavioural proximate determinant of fertility partially
captured by this status. Evidence from western societies where partners have chosen each
other and are often romantically involved suggests quite rapid declines in frequency of
sexual intercourse with duration of marriage. I am unaware of similar studies for arranged
marriages, but would be surprised if the patterns were the same.
Decisions about reproduction are also deeply bound up with the nature of the
relationship, which evolves over time. The shy young bride who meets her husband at the
wedding and then moves in with his family or into his village gradually adapts and adopts
new behaviour. A generation later she will have become the mother-in-law who may
control the destiny of her son’s new bride. In between a wide range of experiences
ranging from possible domestic violence to attachment and intimacy, possible emerging
autonomy, success in childbearing and childrearing may all have played a part in
changing the nature and meaning of the relationship, as will employment, land tenure and
a range of external forces. Although much of the negotiation process may take place
before cohabitation or marriage, similar evolution of the nature of intimate relationships
takes places for the modern Western couple.
Our emotions play an important part in any long-term relationship. A ‘good’ partnership
can successfully meet many of our basic needs for sex, for nurture, and for intimacy
(Panksepp, 1998). On the other hand intimate partnerships are too often associated with
emotions of fear, disgust, or anger (Fiske 2004). Demographers need to engage with
neuroscience and gain a better understanding of the role of emotions in relationships (see
also Massey 2002). Moreover, we need to pay attention to some emergent suggestions
that pair-bonding and love generate lasting changes in brain structure (Young 2003). In
other words, the key importance of feedback loops in relationship formation and
breakdown need to be included in our consideration.
Partnership breakdown is also clearly a process, partially recognized by the distinction
often made between separation and divorce. The gradual deterioration of a relationship
can involve many elements, including sudden shocks such as unfaithfulness, but also
often has lasting effects for all individuals involved, differentially affecting the
emotional, physical and socio-economic well-being of both partners and of children. The
opportunities and constraints regarding partnership breakdown also need to be
incorporated in our understanding. How far do the options for dealing with a deteriorating
relationship include all of exit, voice, and loyalty (see Rusbult et al 1991 for an
adaptation of Hirschman’s (1970) framework in the context of relationships)? What is the
balance of these options and the consequences for the man and usually more significantly
the woman?
Since the pioneering work of McLanahan and Bumpass (1988) and Kiernan (1992) on the
consequences of divorce for children, the recognition of the pre-divorce stresses for
children of a decaying partnership has been evidence of attention to process. But
partnerships break down in a variety of ways, ranging from acrimonious and possibly
violent disputes following which the partners hate each other, want no contact, and use
child custody as a weapon, to those where the decision to part is harmonious, andHobcraft 24/1/05 9
friendship, frequent contact between partners and shared childrearing are maintained. The
ramifications of the partnership breakdown for all involved, perhaps most importantly for
childrearing, are a key concern.
One of the key features of partnerships that demographers and other disciplines have
failed to address properly is their dyadic nature. Two key actors are involved and both
bring legacies of their inheritance, upbringing and past circumstances and behaviour to
the relationship. Yet all too often it is only characteristics of one partner that are
examined. I return to this issue later in the paper. A good example of a serious attempt to
provide a framework covering the diversity of genetic, evolutionary, neural, and
psychological pathways and processes involved in partnership formation is given by
Miller and Rodgers (2001; also see Spotts et al 2004).
2.2 Parenthood not births
It is curious how demographers have lost sight of reproductivity, one of the key themes of
work in the subject up to the 1950s (e.g. Hajnal 1950). The concentration on births as the
key events is dominant. Yet it is surely the case that few individuals or couples choose to
have a baby per se, although some interpreters would see having a birth as fulfilling a
basic need to nurture (e.g. Foster 2003). Rather, they have the goal of producing
socialized, healthy and successful or fulfilled adults, which may also involve lineage
issues. For parents, even the traditional demographic notion of reproductivity, which
merely requires survival, is inadequate. These concerns are also partially captured in the
evolutionary notion of fitness, which captures a still too narrow role for establishing the
circumstances for successful reproduction. The concern with parental investments in a
broad sense also features in discussions of behavioural ecologists or evolutionary
psychologists (e.g. Worthman 2003). In economics some of these concerns are
encapsulated in the notion of quality-quantity tradeoffs (Becker 1960; for a recent review
linked to evolutionary biology, see Lam 2003).
But, as we have argued at greater length elsewhere (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995; Hobcraft
2001; Hobcraft 2003), this notion of becoming a parent and the long-term nature of the
investment should deeply affect the way we view and analyze decisions about
childbearing. In particular, we have argued that parents who make choices need to make
judgements about their prospects for the next twenty years or so, both at the individual
and societal level, and that changes in these mid-term security prospects have played a
significant part in fertility trends in the developed world (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995;
Hobcraft 1996). The mid-term security factors identified include shifts in partnership
stability, in welfare smoothing over the life-course and child services, in income and
employment security, housing circumstances, in work-life balance, money-time trade-
offs, and gender relations. The contribution of changes in security to understanding the
recent collapse in fertility in Central and Eastern Europe is fairly evident, although the
relative balance is still unclear.
In so far as parents can successfully anticipate their futures on these elements, there are
some interesting issues of potential reverse causality involved in the decision process.Hobcraft 24/1/05 10
Moreover, there is a need for demography to come to terms with the issues involved in
rearing and nurturing ‘successful’ citizens as part of our realm of study. At the very least,
these are among the key consequences of the narrow demographic behaviour of the event
of a birth. As such, they form a legitimate and important focus for our attention, though
we too often neglect consequences of demographic behaviour at the micro-level.
Recognition of the potential importance of the fluidity of partnership contexts early in the
life of the child has recently become a focus of attention both in the US and in the UK
(Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan 2002; Kiernan and Smith 2003).
Of course, the process of becoming and of being a parent is also bound up with a series of
legacies of the past for both parents and is taken under constraints of reproductive
biology, personality and emotions, genes, the means of control over reproduction, ideas,
and interpersonal and institutional contexts.
2.3 Potential or Well-Being not death
We are all familiar with the WHO definition of health as being a state of complete
physical, mental, and social well-being and not just the avoidance of disease or death. Yet
much demographic analysis, using our staple tools of life-tables and survival analysis, is
too often concerned just with death as an event. However, thanks in part to the influence
of the US National Institute for Aging, demographic research on ageing has moved a
considerable way to adopting an approach that focuses more broadly (e.g. Wise 2001 and
several earlier volumes), though there is still an undue emphasis on disease and morbidity
rather than positive health (but see Singer and Ryff 2001).
The broad health agenda, involving the need to increase cooperation across disciplines
ranging from molecular genetics through neuroscience, psychology, public health, and
medicine through to the social sciences is well encapsulated in Singer and Ryff (2001).
This broader theme is one to which I return later in the paper. However, in an influential
earlier paper, Ryff and Singer (1998) put forward a persuasive case that resonates with
my position in this section (my italics):
‘Positive human health is best construed as a multidimensional dynamic process
rather than a discrete end state. That is, human well-being is ultimately an issue
of engagement in living, involving expression of a broad range of human
potentialities: intellectual, social, emotional, and physical.’ (p.2)
We need to learn from and engage in such research. In particular, demographers seem not
to have linked into nor learnt from research on hedonism and eudaimonism (see Ryan and
Deci, 2001 for an excellent and wide-ranging review). Briefly, hedonism is concerned
with happiness or subjective well-being (see Diener et al 1999), whilst eudaimonism is
concerned with broader fulfilment of potential. Well-being and mental health are
implicated among the pathways to physical health (Singer and Ryff 2001). Happiness has
been a serious research issue for economists recently and they have been especially
concerned that subjective well-being and income are not well correlated, especially
among richer societies (Kahneman 1999; Frey and Stutzer 2002; Layard 2002). But thereHobcraft 24/1/05 11
is research to show that subjective well-being is strongly related to, and probably a
consequence of, demographic behaviour: divorce matters as much as unemployment for
short to mid-term unhappiness(Lucas et al 2003). In a broader context, these concerns
with positive health link to a wide range of recent agendas, including a human
development approach(UNDP annual), poverty alleviation and health (World Bank
2000), social exclusion as a concept in Europe and elsewhere, and a capabilities and
functionings approach to development (Sen 1993). Ultimately living is about life not
death.
2.4 Position not migrations
The great majority of changes of residence are bound up with other life processes,
whether enforced through a build up of persecution, repeated crop failures, imprisonment,
or failure to pay rent or mortgage, or chosen through change of or search for job, search
for better school catchment area, changed health status, or on marriage. Location per se is
rarely the prime motivation factor, though amenities or facilities can be important. But
migration is part of a class of processes that are bound up with position in society. This
includes not just residential stratification, but job and social hierarchies too. It is no
accident that much of the pioneering work on social or occupational mobility was done
by demographers (Hogben 1938 part II, Glass 1954 , Blau and Duncan 1967), though this
perception is possibly  blurred by the heavy overlap of demographers with sociology
departments, particularly in the US.
Evolutionary demographers also make much of the role of status and hierarchy in mating
and reproductive behaviour. Just as the study of partnership processes is hampered by
lack of serious treatment of the dyad, much study of mobility is hampered by inadequate
attention to both origins and destinations, though simple push-pull interpretations have
long partially recognized this issue (Ravenstein 1885).
The decision to move involves an ongoing evaluation of alternatives, though this is not
likely to be a continuous preoccupation. The evaluation of the current position (job,
housing, location, friendship network, etc) is almost inevitably better informed (by
experience) than can be the evaluation of (multiple) alternative positions (except for
returnees). Thus, there is usually an informational asymmetry involved and we ought
therefore to pay greater attention to the perceptual and risk-taking aspects of such
behaviour. How did pioneer migrants from Europe to the US or Australia evaluate the
benefits of such a move? They would have had much greater certainty about possible
push-factors (e.g. the Irish potato famine) than about the trials and tribulations and gains
that awaited them if they survived the journey. This kind of informational asymmetry
affects almost all choices about position (and many other demographic choices too, e.g.
partnership and parenthood).
How do we deal with this in modelling and understanding the positional behaviour of
individuals (and some collectives)? What can we learn from psychology and other
relevant disciplines about the nature of such decision-making? For example, how relevant
is the research on prospect theory that suggests that decision-making is reference-Hobcraft 24/1/05 12
dependent (and thus incompatible with expected utility theory) and risk-averse
concerning gains, but risk-seeking for losses (see Kahneman 2002 for a summary)?
2.5 Personal ties: Family, Kinship, Intergenerational and Friendship links not
household structure
Co-residence in households is of considerable importance for a reasonable fraction of
(reciprocal) transfers of time, money, and emotional support and can have particular
ramifications for nurture of children. However, key aspects of demographic behaviour
can be just as affected by such transfers across household boundaries, through individual
transactions, public and private provision of welfare and child services, and tax and
benefit systems. We cannot hope to understand the nature of demographic choice
properly without looking at this wider connectedness.
These interlinkages are increasingly complex and important with rising partnership
fragility, especially for any children involved. It is no longer implausible to examine
experiences of children who are connected to up to eight grandparents or step-
grandparents (or occasionally even more). Step-siblings and half-siblings have also
become fairly commonplace. Vastly different arrangements of time, money, and nurture
can be involved.
But similar points can be made in the context of transfers in old age. There is some
demographic research and much more theorising on an old-age security rationale for
childbearing in traditional societies and on the risks involved for those, especially
widows, with no surviving (and often co-resident) children (e.g. Cain 1986 and the useful
review by Das Gupta 1993). But this ignores the lifetime or post-marriage networks of
reciprocal kinship and friendship networks that exist in any long-standing (rural)
community. Transfers of care, emotional support, food and other resources across
household boundaries are normative and yet somehow ignored in much demographic and
evolutionary theorising on these issues. If you don’t look, you do not find such links.
They are rarely even discussed or contemplated, let alone explored.
In developed societies too, inter-household transfers, often reciprocal, play a large part in
people’s support networks and systems. This connectedness is increasingly being
recognised and incorporated in survey instruments. There are important questions as to
what differences in the balance between intra-household, intra-family, other
interpersonal, privately purchased, and public provision of care, services, and money
make to childbearing decisions, partnership stability, well-being, and position. Moreover,
it is possible that the source of such support is of secondary importance to its availability
and accessibility.
3. Alleles, Brains, and Context: The ABC of Demographic Behaviour.
In this section I firstly consider some of the insights and questions that arise from
consideration of the genotype, the brain, mind, and endocrine system, and other
biological or physiological aspects of the progression of the phenotype. Secondly, IHobcraft 24/1/05 13
consider the wide range of contexts that exert external influences on the person. It is
essential to make clear that the apparent separation of pathways within the person from
the processes outside the person is an expositional artefact. Much of what I have to say
will emphasise the growing awareness of the critical importance of interplays between
the person or phenotype and external or ‘environmental’ influences and of feedbacks,
interactions and correlations. Gene expression is often determined by such feedback,
frequently from the external environment. Evidence is beginning to accumulate that
specific variations (polymorphisms) in alleles substantially condition sensitivity to
environmental stress (see Caspi et al 2002 and 2003; and, for a useful and readable
summary, Ridley 2002). There is also growing evidence that external stimuli evoke
endocrine responses that can bring about lasting changes in brain structure. The deep and
unresolved issues concerning the interplays of free will and instinct in cognitive
processes and some of the work on decision-making heuristics will also feature. I shall
have least to say concerning reproductive biology, because this is the area already most
familiar to many demographers.
3.1 Genetics and demographic behaviour
There has been a flurry of recent work using behavioural-genetic models to explore the
extent to which genetics play a part in various aspects of demographic behaviour. Almost
all of this work relies on quantitative genetic (or ACE) models, using designs such as
twin or adoption studies that can in principle separate the sources of variability in
behaviour into the Additive genetic component (A), a Common or shared environment
component (C), and a non-shared Environment element (E) (see DeFries et al 200?,
Rutter et al 2001 and Rutter 2003). This literature is most extensive in relation to mental
health, especially psychopathologies. I have reviewed the studies that relate to fertility,
divorce, and age at first intercourse at some length elsewhere (Hobcraft 2003), so my
discussion here will pick up on some of the major underlying issues.
Those who are sceptical about the role of genes can only make a powerful case for the
lack of genetic influences through studies that explicitly include a genetically-sensitive
design (Rutter et al 2001). Moreover, it is only possible to demonstrate ‘environmental’
effects on behaviour through such designs, since the dual inheritance aspect of genetic
and shared family environment otherwise confounds the two. Some ingenious work is
now taking place using identical twins to demonstrate unequivocal ‘environmental’
effects (see Caspi 2004, for example).
However, the behaviour-genetic models do have a number of limitations. Firstly, the
genetic component almost always includes all gene-environment interactions, which may
overstate the direct role of genes, possibly substantially. The more homogeneous the
population the smaller will be the ‘environmental’ elements and thus the higher the
measured heritability. Gene-environment interactions complicate this further (Rutter and
Silberg 2002). The ‘shared’ environment is essentially the role of common experiences
from growing up in the same family. There is a large literature concerned with the
evidence that this fraction of the variation is small (Plomin and Daniels 1987; MaccobyHobcraft 24/1/05 14
2000; Plomin, Asbury and Dunn 2001). Concomitantly, the share of variability attributed
to non-shared environment is often quite large, though this includes any residual
unexplained variance, which is not always acknowledged (see Turkheimer and Waldron
2000). The models depend quite heavily on an assumption that children reared in the
same family experience equal environments and there are serious issues concerning twin
studies (Rutter 2003). The assumption often made is that identical twins may have more
similar environments because they are genetically and physically indistinguishable; this
would lead to an understatement of the genetic component. I am not aware of any serious
discussion of the extremely plausible idea that twins, and especially identical twins,
actually try much harder than other siblings to differentiate themselves and thus to shape
their environments to be more different (for an interesting and relevant treatment of this
issue in the context of IQ scores see Feldman et al 2000). Moreover, for twins reared
apart and for adoption studies, there is usually very little serious attention to the issues of
sample selection through selective placement to higher status environments. One recent
study estimates that this selective placement in homogenous environments could account
for genetic sources of variance in adoption studies being overstated by about a third
compared with the general population (Stoolmiller 1999).
Although there are a number of reasons for supposing that direct genetic heritability
could be overstated it is exceedingly unlikely to be of negligible importance for almost
any human behaviour examined to date. However, as discussed by Hobcraft (2003), some
of the behaviour-genetic modelling of fertility (Kohler, Rodgers and Christensen 1999,
Rodgers, Hughes et al 2001, Rodgers, Kohler et al 2001, and Kohler and Rodgers 2003 )
and of divorce (McGue and Lykken 1992, and O’Connor et al 2000) raises at least as
many questions as it answers and is not always convincing (see also Morgan and
Berkowitz King 2001 and the comments by Capron and Vetta and by Kohler).
The real issues are to identify the pathways through which genes work or interplay with
the ‘environment’, rather than using ‘black box’ models that simply partition the
variance. The advances in molecular biology make this possible to explore, although such
exploration can be very complex and time-consuming (Risch 2000; Plomin and Crabbe
2000). It is likely that the role of genes in most complex behaviours that are not
pathological will result from an accumulation of small effects over several genes, rather
than few genes with a large effect (Plomin et al 2003). Increasingly the availability of
microarrays or ‘gene chips’ (Lockhart and Barlow 2001, Carpenter and Sabatini 2004)
and new methods of analysis (Butte 2002) make the search for multiple genetic markers
(or Quantitative Trait Loci) faster and more plausible.
One study has now shown an association between multiple marriages and the 7-repeat
allele of the dopamine D4 receptor gene (Rowe 2003), which is also linked in some
studies to ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, see Faraone et al 2001 and
Thapar 2003) and to risk-taking behaviour. Other studies have begun to explore linkages
of the dopamine D2 receptor gene and low fertility for men (e.g. MacMurray et al 2003)
and of the risk allele for G6PD-deficiency in females to poor intrauterine growth and
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Several issues hinder this search process, although significant progress is being made.
Firstly, most such searches treat the effects associated with the various markers as being
additive (the broader general linear model without interactions that also plagues much
social and behavioural research). At the moment sample sizes and statistical procedures
can identify individual markers associated with about one per cent of variance (as good as
many of our own predictors) but it is anticipated that many genes will account for smaller
components of variation (see Plomin et al 2003 and Plomin 2003). Secondly, there is
emerging evidence for the importance of gene-gene interactions (epistasis) in many
contexts, including the link of the APOE gene (that demographers are familiar with in the
context of Alzheimer’s disease see Ewbank 2000) to coronary artery disease (see
Grigorenko 2003). There is also accumulating evidence for epistatic interactions without
identifiable ‘main’ effects of the individual genes (Grigorenko 2003). Thirdly, gene
expression is often triggered by events external to the phenotype and there is much
concern about the importance of gene-environment interactions and correlations (Rutter
and Silberg 2002 on emotional and behavioural disturbance; Rowe et al 1999 and
Turkheimer et al 2003 on IQ; Reiss et al 2000 on adolescent development). Most genetic
screening efforts do not have good measures of these external factors (strictly external to
the genome, but usually in this context external to the phenome or person). Perhaps the
most compelling evidence to date for gene-environment interactions at the molecular
level comes from the Dunedin study: one showing that a genotype conferring high levels
of expression of the neurotransmitter-metabolizing enzyme monomamine oxidase A
(MAOA) appears to moderate the effects of child maltreatment on the subsequent
development of antisocial behaviour (Caspi et al 2002); and a further study showing that
individuals with one or two copies of the short allele of the 5-HTT promoter
polymorphism (in the serotonin transporter region) are more likely to show depressive
symptoms, diagnosable depression, and suicidality following experience of stressful life
events than those homozygous for the long allele (Caspi et al 2003). The latter finding
was both guided by the role of serotonin reuptake-inhibitor drugs in treating depression
(providing a ‘candidate gene’) and is more plausible as a consequence of this known link.
Of course, as Caspi and his collaborators readily acknowledge, these findings require
replication.
Demographers potentially have much to contribute in this field of teasing out or
replicating molecular biological gene-environment interactions in representative
prospective population samples that collect DNA (unlike behaviour, experience, or
attitudes where retrospective information is often difficult or impossible to collect, the
invariant nature of DNA permits collection at any point in time).
3.2 Brain, mind, and endocrine systems
In addition to engaging with behavioural genetics I also want to argue that demographers
have much to gain from knowledge of and interaction with neuroscience and with
cognitive psychology. Demographic behaviour usually involves choices and our
understanding of choice processes has to be fatally incomplete if we ignore developments
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Valuable insights can come from non-biological work on decision heuristics (Kahneman
2002; Brocas and Carrillo 2003;Gigerenzer et al 1999, especially the chapters on mate
search and on parental investment; and Billari and Prskawetz 2003) as to how choices
may be made using simple decision heuristics rather than full or bounded rational choice.
Such work, for example Kahneman (2002 for a summary) on differences in being risk-
averse for gains but risk-seeking for losses may give us useful insights into the
asymmetric decision processes involved in partner choice, becoming a parent, or
changing position. Moreover the recent concerns of psychology and economics with
hedonic happiness or subjective well-being (Kahneman Diener and Schwartz 1999, and
Frey and Stutzer 2002) and how it relates to the economic concept of utility are clearly
relevant to our agenda on potential or positive health, although eudaimonic well-being is
closer to this agenda (Brocas and Carillo 2003, Ryan and Deci 2001, Ryff and Singer
1998)
But we may also be able to gain purchase on mating and reproductive behaviour from
affective neuroscience (Davidson, Scherer and Hill Goldsmith 2003; and Panksepp 1998,
especially the chapters on ‘the varieties of love and lust: neural control of sexuality’ and
on ‘love and the social bond: the sources of nurturance and maternal behaviour’). Since
much of the research in neuroscience is based on animal studies we also need to take
account of the trade-offs between innate systems and ‘free-will’ and the likelihood that
these interact and feed back in complex ways through brain structure (e.g. links between
the amygdala and the pre-frontal cortex). Evidence is also accumulating for lasting
synaptic changes that result from stimuli, including emotions, from outside the person
and that brain plasticity continues well into old age (e.g. LeDoux 2002, who makes the
bold claim that ‘we are our synapses’; and Stern and Carstensen 2000).
The aspects of brain structure that demographers are most familiar with are those linked
to sexual dimorphism. Udry’s (1994) controversial  PAA Presidential address or his even
more controversial  article (Udry 2000) and the heated exchanges that resulted in the
American Sociological Review, are an attempt to produce a biosocial theory of gender.
Sexual dimorphism also plays a significant role in much evolutionary theory on
partnership and reproductive strategies (Low 2000; Diamond 1997) and more implicitly
in economic theory on fertility (Becker1991, Lam 2003). Key to the emergence of sexual
dimorphism is the role of testosterone, mediated by aromatase to create estrogen that
masculinizes the brain and mediated by 5-alpha-reductase to create dihydrotestosterone
that masculinizes the body (Panksepp 1998; Schulkin 1999). Some neuroscientists who
work solely on animal studies forget that human populations (and other primates) have
much more developed frontal lobes and are thus much more likely to modify innate
tendencies through exerting control (having ‘free will’). This can be especially true in
attempts to understand reproduction. There is little doubt that sexual dimorphism can
result in exquisite mechanisms that relate sex and reproduction (Cameron 2003, also
Simerly 2002 who entitles his review ‘wired for reproduction’), but there seems to be
more evidence that humans (and other animals) have inbuilt desires or urges to have sex
than to reproduce per se (for several takes on this see Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995, Foster
2003, Worthman 2003).Hobcraft 24/1/05 17
Some evidence is emerging from animal studies, especially from contrasts of
monogamous prairie voles with promiscuous montane voles (Young 2003; Panksepp
1998 chapter 12) about the neuroendocrine bases of monogamy (Young, Wang and Insel
2002) and pair bonding (Curtis and Wang 2003). For female prairie voles oxytocin
released during copulation acts on the oxytocin receptors in the brain to induce lasting
pair bonding and key elements of parental behaviour. For male prairie voles the release of
vasopressin during orgasm similarly acts on vasopressin receptors to produce lasting
bonding and parental behaviour. These results have been fairly thoroughly substantiated
through a variety of techniques. Differences among a wider range of vole species in
social organization have also been linked to differences in patterns of brain receptor
binding of oxytocin and vasopressin. Other studies of rats, sheep, and hamsters also
suggest important roles for oxytocin and vasopressin. Thus there seem to be good
grounds for studies of human populations to explore the genetic markers that lead to the
expression of oxytocin and vasopressin receptors in the prelimbic cortex and nucleus
accumbens, regions that are also involved in the mesolimbic dopamine reward pathway,
suggesting a further role for dopamine D2 receptor markers (taking Young, Wang and
Insel 2002 further than they may wish to go). This is predicated on it being easier to
explore these issues for human populations through the genetic markers that code for the
receptors, rather than through direct brain observation by fMRI (and certainly not through
the invasive approaches used in animal studies). Differences in relevant alleles for males
and females encoding for these receptors would thus be ‘candidate genes’ for the study of
sexuality, bonding, partnership breakdown, and parenting. For the human male sexual
arousal leads to a short term peak in blood plasma levels of vasopressin, whilst
ejaculation is associated with a short term increase in plasma arginine-vasopressin
(Murphy et al 1987, as adapted in Panksepp 1998). I have not found evidence showing
that these bind to relevant receptors in the brain to promote bonding in humans, though it
may exist.
Other tantalising evidence is beginning to emerge on the opioid reward systems in the
brain and social attachments. Reward systems are likely to be important in feedback
mechanisms that establish lasting synaptic responses to a partner or child involved in
long term nurturance or pair bonding. One recent study (Bartels and Zeki 2000) examined
brain responses of 17 subjects who were ‘deeply in love’ to photographs of their love and
of other friends of the same sex using fMRI and found that differential increased brain
activity was, perhaps surprisingly, restricted to very few areas, but seemed to be unique
compared with other responses. Bartel and Zeki conclude:
‘It is however striking that studies of cocaine- and mu-opioid agonist-induced
euphoria have shown increased activity in foci that seem to overlap with all foci
activated in our study: the anterior cingulate cortex, the insula, the caudate
nucleus and the putamen. This suggests a potentially close neural link between
romantic love and euphoric states.’ (p.3833).
Perhaps we shall soon see emerging evidence from brain scans of ‘happily’ married long-
term couples beyond the first burst of romantic love and of couples undergoing
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involved in attachment and partnership breakdown (see also Diamond 2004 on the
distinctions between romantic love and sexual desire).
Further topics where we can engage with neuroscience include the neurobiology of
parental behaviour. A useful review of issues concerning hormones, parental care and
attachment behaviours is given by Schulkin (1999). Key to that review is an
understanding that the hormones prolactin, oxytocin, and vasopressin are also
neuropeptides and thus can feedback to bring about changes in synaptic structure
necessary for long-term bonding. Broader issues covering brain structure and maternal
behaviour, postpartum depression, child abuse and neglect, and intergenerational
continuities in abnormal maternal behaviour are discussed in the final chapter of Numan
and Insel (2003), although their knowledge of social science and psychology literature on
these issues seems patchy and dated (as no doubt would my knowledge of brain structure
to them, one of the problems of trying to engage across disciplinary boundaries).
One other key theme of relevance to sexuality, partnership behaviour, personal ties or
connectedness, and parenthood is the apparent need to nurture (in this context see Foster
2002 and Hobcraft 2003; see also Taylor 2002 and Panksepp 1998), although the
reciprocity involved in such interplays is perhaps better captured by the ‘core social
motive’ of ‘belonging’ (identified by Fiske 2004 as having primacy among her five core
social motives for behaviour, the others being understanding, controlling, enhancing self,
and trusting). This reciprocity and the social aspects of behaviour require that we shift
attention to the other side of the nature via nurture or person-situation interlinkages. We
emphasize again that this apparent separation of nature and nurture is illusory and can be
deeply misleading.
3.3 Context: other persons
Demographic behaviour is evidently deeply bound up with the person or phenotype
interacting with other persons. Children are born into families and are reared by parents
and other adults. Partnership or marriage, reproduction, and sexual activity
quintessentially involve interactions with other persons. Beyond these clear and directly
relevant interpersonal demographic linkages, there are many other potentially important
contexts where the interplay with other persons matters and may shape the values,
attitudes, health, and behaviour of the phenotype and generate feedbacks within the
person, through synapses or gene-environment interplays. These important social
contexts include family and kinship networks, peer groups, friendship or support
networks, care and service providers, employers and workmates, local community, and
wide range of civil society institutions. Yet much research on demographic behaviour
does not address these issues.
Let us begin with the partnership dyad. Sex, cohabitation, marriage, partnership
breakdown, and decisions about childbearing all involve both members of the dyad and
inevitably involve interplays and behavioural adjustments. Both partners bring their
phenotype at the time of relationship formation to the union. Yet we typically know and
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diverse and possibly important issues such as: genetic predispositions, including the
major histocompatibility complex and possible links through pheromones (e.g. Jacob et
al 2002; and comments by Wedekind 2002 and reply by McLintock et al 2002; and from
an evolutionary perspective Thornhill and Gangestad 2003), previous partnership
experiences (not just occurrence), personality traits, peer and family pressures, etc.
Analyses of divorce or partnership breakdown that simply examine the background of
one partner (e.g. whether they experienced parental divorce, or their age at entry into the
union) clearly omit all of the background of the other partner and the intimate and
lifecourse interplays involved during the partnership. This applies equally to the extant
attempts to examine the potential roles of genes and behaviour in divorce. It is rare
indeed to find careful studies that begin to explore these aspects, though see Robins,
Caspi, and Moffitt (2000) on how personality traits of both partners are linked to
relationship quality and Jaffee et al (2003) on an interesting interaction of divorce
consequences with the father’s antisocial behaviour. Relationships evolve over time and
much of the changing character will be attributable to the joint experiences and
interpersonal interplays of the two actors: this can involve shifting power relations,
patterns of intimacy, consequences of childbearing and parenting, employment or health
shocks, and shocks from infidelity, among others.
Similarly, most decisions to bear and rear a child involve two parents: this is a biological
or genetic certainty, but not necessarily a behavioural one though predominantly so.
Since reproduction is such an essential component of evolution and of demographic
behaviour, it is really quite surprising how little attention is paid to the dyadic aspect of
childbearing decisions. At the biological level the fecundity of both partners matters and
genetic mismatches play a part in inhibiting reproduction. But we need to move well
beyond reproductive biology and particularly begin to pay much more attention to how
decisions on reproduction are made and what roles genes, brains, structural constraints,
and interpersonal relationships play in these decisions. This undoubtedly requires major
research projects that involve behavioural geneticists, neuroscientists, psychologists,
social scientists, and demographers at the very least. So does the study of partnerships. A
key element of progress beyond this necessary multidisciplinary approach will be to find
clever ways of designing studies that recognise the dyadic nature of these processes, as
well as sifting available evidential clues so as to identify promising paths to progress (for
a useful attempt to lay out many of the issues involved for human bonding see Miller and
Rodgers 2001).
Family networks, including both kin and partner kin, are also often linked with
demographic behaviour, though the pathways are often more diffuse and less well-
defined. The influence of parents or of parents-in-law on residence, on partnership
formation, particularly for arranged marriages, and on fertility behaviour is claimed more
often than carefully documented. The roles of kin and partner kin in childrearing can also
be considerable. One of the issues that demographic studies do not address is the relative
importance of genes and behaviour in such linkages. We have virtually no evidence, for
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wedlock childbearing or in partnership breakdown are transmitted through nature,
nurture, or the interplay of both.
One of the broader puzzles to emerge is the evidence from behaviour-genetic studies that
suggests common or shared family environment during childhood plays a limited role in
subsequent behaviour (Plomin and Daniels 1987, Dunn and Plomin 1990). The
proponents of this make quite strong claims that this is evidence that most family
influences operate through genes rather than through environment (Plomin, Asbury and
Dunn 2001). Moreover they also claim that most ‘environmental’ components of
behaviour operate through nonshared environment, rather than the narrowly defined
common childhood family rearing environment. However, despite the seemingly clear
results from behaviour-genetic models, there is still lively questioning of these assertions.
Twin studies are regarded by some as largely discredited (Rutter 2003). Since all gene-
environment interactions are allocated to the genetic component rather than to nurture,
the role of family experience is thereby understated (Maccoby 2000). Evidence is
beginning to emerge that shows very strong gene-environment interplays for some
outcomes (Caspi et al 2002 & 2003). Moreover an increasing number of studies of
identical twins are beginning to show significant (clearly) non-genetic differences in
parenting and in behaviour, and may indicate a broader phenomenon of sibling
differentiation, perhaps arising from the siblings themselves reacting to genetic
similarities (most strongly for twins and especially MZ twins) to create different
environments and responses (a ‘reactive’ gene-environment correlation – see Plomin
1994 for a useful discussion of the differing types of gene-environment correlations).
It may well prove to be the case that almost all of the genetic variation within families
arises from gene-environment interplays and that, perhaps, ten per cent of total variation
in behaviour is due to genes per se, ten per cent to environment per se, and something
like 40 per cent to gene-environment interactions: quite a different story from the more
usual attribution of about 50 per cent to genes. Attempts to explain the variation due to
nonshared environment in behaviour-genetic models have also met with difficulties, with
measured variables capturing little – again, gene-environment interplays may prove
important (Turkheimer and Waldron 2000; Plomin, Asbury and Dunn 2001; and Plomin
et al 2003). Whatever the outcome on these debates, it is overwhelming clear that the
only routes to understanding the relative importance of gene-environment interplays
arises from paying close attention to genetically-informed designs (Rutter et al 2001), or
as is increasingly likely, having direct measurements of genes and alleles. Simple fixed
effects models for siblings, beloved by many economic demographers (e.g. Geronimus
and Korenman 1992 and Lopez Turley 2003 on young motherhood, but see Moffitt 2003
for a more cautious view) are inadequate for this purpose and can give seriously
misleading results in the presence of interactions between the measured and unmeasured
variables (that include shared genes and often childhood experiences too) and often
involve other potentially distorting sample-selection problems (Moffitt 2003).
Nonshared environment for siblings or twins arises both during childhood and after they
leave the natal family. Interplays with other people occur in schools and some childcare
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employers, friendship networks, carers, neighbours, and a potentially broad range of civil
society institutions. So far, the limited work on the possible impact of these complex
interlinkages on demographic behaviour has been largely limited to estimates of (often
poorly-delineated and conceptually vague) community or neighbourhood effects (e.g.
early examples by Casterline 1985 and 1987, also Brooks-Gunn, Duncan and Aber 1997).
These limited studies have not always proved very effective at eliciting clear
neighbourhood or community effects, which have often been disappointingly small for
those who think they should be stronger. In a different field, I have come across one
example that pays closer attention to a range of these interpersonal effects impact on
early adolescent development, looking at the joint influence of neighbourhoods, nuclear
families, friendship groups, and schools (Cook et al 2002). Interestingly, the individual
contexts each appeared to show weak influence, but the joint influence was large.
We have a long way to go in conceptualising and measuring interpersonal contexts and
their likely paths of influence onto demographic behaviour. The current uses of multi-
level models (clearly one useful tool) suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity about the
levels and groups identified and about the likely pathways involved, especially probable
differential responses to the group-level influences for individuals with differing
characteristics. Moreover, without identifying measures at the higher levels of
aggregation (and this may well not be enough) it is not possible to distinguish the
influences arising from interpersonal interplays from those arising from structures: is it
community or neighbourhood that matters; school environment and teachers or fellow
pupils; carers or transfers? Most demographers could benefit from a close reading of two
classics on the topic of macro-micro interplays that did pay close attention to conceptual
issues and pathways (Blalock and Wilken 1979; Coleman 1990; see also Cacioppo et al
2000 in the context of neuroscience).
3.4 Contexts: structures, institutions, opportunities and constraints
There are also a large number of potential influences on demographic behaviour that arise
from structures, rather than from interpersonal relationships. These structural elements,
too, can operate at quite different levels of aggregation. One evident example, researched
in the family planning and health literatures, is the role of provision and accessibility of
services (Casterline 1985 & 1987). These services often most directly impinge on the
individual’s reproductive behaviour or health outcomes at a fairly local level, but are
shaped and constrained by issues as diverse as national (and sometimes international or
sub-national) policies, political will, supply chains, and management structures.
In the context of health and well-being there are important and largely unanswered
questions about how differing health systems and differences in public/ private mixes of
health provision matter, about the pathways and mechanisms through which public health
measures affect well-being, and about the ways in which these structural features are
mediated by individual attributes, including behaviours, socioeconomic status, and
genetic predispositions. More broadly, potential is affected by disease ecologies, welfare
systems, labour markets (often fairly localized), education and training opportunities, and
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Partnership and parenthood are also influenced by a variety of structures at differing
levels of aggregation: education and training compete; housing markets shape and
constrain choices; welfare regimes and child service provision affect parenting decisions
and choices; gender, class, ethnic, and intergenerational structures exert their impact;
normative and cultural pressures and government interference in or support for sexual
and reproductive rights and choice all matter too.
Occupational and geographic positions are strongly bound to housing and labour markets
and class structures. State policies and welfare regimes also influence such movements.
There are considerable difficulties in demonstrating and teasing apart these structural
influences on demographic behaviour. Firstly, as is clear form the brief discussion above,
there is a wide range of such elements, each of which may have small impact, but these
may cumulate into a much larger influence, partly through interplays. A simple example
would be the potential interplay between school hours and meal provision and normal
work hours. Secondly, many issues themselves cross-cut: parenting decisions may be
highly dependent on child services being available, affordable, and accessible, but may
be unaffected by whether such provision is from the public sector, the private sector, or
the family. Another illustration comes from the recent series of European governments
that are explicitly trying to raise fertility with one-off cash incentives for having babies.
These payments are usually quite small compared with the real long-term costs of rearing
a child and serious exploration of likely differential responses by income or
socioeconomic status, of potential perverse incentives for risk-takers and of unintended
consequential burdens for the welfare state is urgently required.
In order to make real progress in documenting and disentangling such complexities we
need clearer mid-level theories or frameworks that help to shape and structure data
collection and analysis. Moreover, since many of these influences often do not vary much
within a single country, we shall have to use clever and fairly descriptive approaches
based on comparable information to tease out their relative importance. The UNECE
Gender and Generation Programme contains an important contextual component that
should enable some progress to be made. But these topics are conceptually and
analytically difficult.
3.5 Progression of the person through the life-course
Throughout our discussion so far, we have emphasized that genes, brain, mind, person,
other persons, and structures all interplay over time, both within and across these
domains. Understanding human behaviour, including demographic behaviour, thus
demands attention to multiple dynamic processes and involves many complex feedbacks
and interactions (Billari and Prskawetz 2003 illustrate one potentially useful approach to
such issues). As we progress in our understanding we shall surely find that a whole series
of ‘life packages’, sequential chains, key precursors, and conditional triggering or
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The key actor to be considered as the focus in this study is the individual person or
phenotype. Ultimately, a lot of human behaviour involves decisions or choices made by
individuals. As so nicely captured by Fiske (2004), these individuals need to belong (and
thus interact with other persons), to understand (in order to relate and to make choices
more informed), to control (their own lives and perhaps the interplay with others and
structures), to enhance themselves, and to trust (other persons and institutions). Individual
capacities, traits, and attributes change through their life course; even apparently fixed
characteristics such as sex at birth or race change their meaning and are mediated through
gender structures or discrimination according to the life-history and temporal and spatial
context of the individual concerned. So, at any one time, individuals bear the legacies of
their inheritance, endowments, and past experiences and bring these to any current choice
or behaviour. Their choices and behaviours are also affected and constrained by those
legacies and by their current circumstances.
But the goal of science is to try to put structure on this potentially infinite set of legacies
and current attributes and contexts and disentangle what really matters for particular
decisions or behaviour. To do so requires sharper conceptualisation and measurement, a
multidisciplinary approach, large-scale investment, and innovative analysis and
modelling. This is always one of the great challenges and there is no simple recipe for
progress, but what is needed is a much greater effort to make progress and some
serendipitous or talented individuals to make the bold steps required.
A great deal of emphasis in demographic research is on the current (or at the time of a
recent event) characteristics of the person: for example income and other measures of
socioeconomic status, housing status, marital status, parity, age. Yet the pathways by
which this status was reached can clearly matter too. Does the current socioeconomic
status reflect recent (or longer term) upward or downward movements? These directional
changes may have profound implications for decisions about housing mobility,
partnership coresidence, or becoming a parent. Yet our literature all too rarely deals with
the impact of shocks on demographic behaviours. For a noteworthy and thoughtful
exception to this see Michael (1988 and the earlier Becker, Landes and Michael 1977).
Occasionally attention is paid to trying to capture more lasting attributes: for example
human capital, ‘permanent income’, or social class (usually really based on current or
most recent occupation). The proliferating set of concepts around cumulative ‘capital’,
including wealth, human (Becker 1964), social (Coleman 1988), health (Grossman 1972),
and sexual (Michael 2004) capital also reflect a greater attention to the person’s life-
course. Equally, however imperfect, measures of the ‘big five’ personality traits
(Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional stability or Neuroticism,
and Intellect or Openness to experience, see Costa and McCrae 1992), of IQ or ‘general
ability’ (Plomin 2003), and more recently the concept of emotional intelligence (Goleman
1995) try to capture more lasting characteristics of the person. There is also a huge
psychological literature on resiliency, lasting characteristics that can serve to protect
individuals from entering disadvantage or can promote easier exit (Rutter 2000, Luthar,
Cicchetti and Becker 2000, Luthar 2003). This in turn relates to recent theorising about
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The mediating role of genes and brains in resiliency is also becoming a topic of interest
(Rutter 2003a, Kim-Cohen et al 2004) and Serbin and Karp (2003 and 2004) provide a
useful summary on intergenerational aspects of resilience and vulnerability.
Although all of these constructs, measures and theories are concerned with lasting
features of the person, all are malleable.  There is ever-growing documentation of brain
plasticity, even into old age (Stern and Carstensen 2000, Kolb, Gibb and Robinson 2003,
LeDoux 2003); effects of serious disadvantage can be overcome (as shown for Romanian
orphans’ IQ, Duyme 2004), knowledge and skills can always be accumulated, and shocks
of unemployment, bereavement, or partnership breakdown can have short and long-term
impacts on well-being and happiness (Lucas et al 2003).
4. Alternative paradigms for population research
Demography has always been an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary programme (e.g.
Stycos 1987) and has drawn on a wide range of approaches and tools to address our field
of study. The life table, the tool that perhaps distinguished us as a discipline (along with
stable population theory, with its origins in biology), had its origins in insurance and is
now completely subsumed under survival or event history analysis and is no longer our
special domain. So it is clear that population is a field of study, rather than a discipline.
We have always looked to a range of disciplines to provide us with ideas and approaches.
In recent years, the dominant paradigm for much demographic (and empirical
sociological) research has arguably become economics – for example, two of the three
papers commissioned for a recent symposium on causality in population research dwelt
entirely on econometric approaches (Moffitt 2003 and Smith 2003). We still draw on
sociology and there has been a recent influx of (quasi-) anthropological approaches too
(Fricke 2003). Our research on fertility also links to reproductive biology and on
mortality and health to epidemiology and the health sciences.
The biggest movement of emphasis and a very clear shift of focus towards
multidisciplinary work have come in the field of ageing and health research (Wise 2000,
and Singer and Ryff 2001). Here demographers have distinctive insights to offer and have
played a very significant part in the new approaches, but also very clearly linked to a
much more wide-ranging research agenda drawing on many disciplines (e.g. Singer and
Ryff 2001; and relatedly Wachter and Finch 1997 on longevity). Examples of this new
approach are the massive multidisciplinary effort that went into the US Health and
Retirement Study and the newer English Longitudinal Study of Ageing. Moreover, many
existing ageing studies now collect biomarkers, including DNA (Finch, Vaupel and
Kinsella 2000). This shift in emphasis to broad ranging interdisciplinary approaches for
scientific research is beginning to impact other areas, such as child development
(Shonkoff and Phillips 2000) and underlies the recent ‘NIH Roadmap’ for future research
priorities in the USA (Zerhouni 2003). There are also beginnings of this wider approach
in relation to research on the biodemography of fertility and family formation (Wachter
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But there is still a long way to go in making demographers aware of, prepared for, and
connected to this wider programme of research. I believe that we can learn a great deal
from other disciplines that rarely feature among our collaborators or in our training. In
looking to other disciplines, I shall emphasise four themes where we can derive real
benefits. Firstly, we can learn a great deal from how other disciplines structure questions
and problems. Secondly, they can provide alternative theoretical approaches and tools
for analysis. Third, they provide a basis for new knowledge and findings. Fourthly, they
act as a source of collaborators and potential recruits for demographic research.
Inevitably my treatment of alternative disciplinary paradigms will be selective and cannot
possibly do full justice in the space available. I shall begin with a brief discussion of
some aspects of economics as currently used within demography and briefly point to
some promising newer developments linking economics to psychology that may help. I
shall then give a fuller discussion of links to psychology, since it is clear from my
preceding text that I believe engagement with this discipline is essential for progress in
population research. Then I shall look at briefly at biology and  epidemiology (see also
Burch 2003b for a valuable discussion of links to physics and modelling philosophies
within that discipline) .
4.1 Economics
The strong theoretical underpinnings of economics give it great leverage and the relative
absence of alternative analytic methods for large-scale datasets in other social sciences
means that economics risks exerting a too dominant hegemony. If blame has to be
attached to this situation, it has to fall on the other social sciences and their failure to
develop rigour. However, current econometric practice and the underlying theory are
probably acting as a straitjacket to progress in a number of respects.
In particular, a great deal of recent work has been narrowly focussed on the challenging
task of trying to assess whether an observed association between (often only) one
antecedent and an outcome is causal. This work is often very ingenious and technically
sophisticated (e.g. a summary statement from one of the major contributors - Heckman
2000; for different takes on similar issues see Winship and Morgan 1999 and Little and
Rubin 2000). Moffitt (2003) gave a summary treatment in the context of the debates
concerning the association of teenage motherhood with subsequent disadvantage. A key
focus in this approach is trying to remove the potential effects of unmeasured covariates,
a real problem in assessing causality. However this has perhaps distorted priorities and
focus in that more attention is often paid to the error term in statistical models than to the
substantive elements and common usage has slipped towards calling all unobserved
measures ‘unobservables’.
Key themes of this paper are an emphasis on the importance of pathways rather than
single causes, the likely crucial role of interplays and interactions, and the need to move
away from ‘black-box’ approaches and capture as much as possible through
measurement. There will of course always remain unmeasured (and possibly even
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statements. However, I am not convinced that causality can be established through ever
more technical tricks in statistical models. Rather, I think progress towards understanding
requires elucidation of the relevant pathways and dynamic theoretical models and that the
balance of effort must shift in this direction.
Ultimately proof of causality may require carefully designed randomized experiments,
although economists have made ingenious use of natural experiments to try to get closer
to this (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000. However, even randomised controlled trials do not
escape the problems of interplays and causal chains inherent in much of the within-
person pathways discussed earlier and their interplays with the ‘environment. For
example, wherever there are gene-environment interplays that involve the stimulus (or
intervention or drug treatment) under exploration, such trials will often mask stronger
associations within the sub-group with specific susceptible alleles: think, for example, of
assessing the results of a randomised control trial to assess the possible causal role of an
intervention to reduce stress in dealing with the onset of depression that does not control
for polymorphisms in the 5-HTT gene if the Caspi et al (2003) study proves robust and
replicable.
An important related issue that bedevils many studies, including most black-box fixed
effects or behavioural-genetics models, is that of sample selection. For example, sibling
studies related to teenage motherhood restrict the sample to sibling pairs where one had a
teenage birth and the other did not. Yet no-one would really maintain that there was a
‘cliff’ at the 20
th birthday – there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the (possibly
spurious) subsequent disadvantage for early motherhood extends beyond the teen years;
the risks would appear to decline with increasing age at motherhood (e.g. Hobcraft and
Kiernan 2001). Given that ages at first birth are correlated within families, the restriction
to selected sibling pairs reduces the sample variation and thus provides estimates that are
biased downwards. Moreover, it is highly plausible that any negative consequences of
early motherhood are partly conditioned by the genome and by earlier childhood
experiences. Hobcraft and Kiernan (2001) provide suggestive evidence for interactions of
childhood poverty with early motherhood for some of the negative associations with
subsequent disadvantage d by. It is fairly obvious and recognised by many (eg the recent
summary by Moffitt 2003) that fixed-effects models give misleading results in the
presence of interactions of the measured components with the unobserved ones.
Another topic of lively debate within economics is the rational choice paradigm (see, for
example, the collection of readings in Elster 1986). At least two Nobel laureates in
economics have gained their awards through challenging this paradigm: both come from
psychology as a discipline. Herbert Simon (eg Simon 1957) introduced the notion of
bounded rationality and some serious theoretical developments have taken place in this
area. More recently these notions too have come under sustained challenge and scrutiny,
with the extensive work by Kahneman and Tversky on decision-making heuristics,
prospect theory and loss aversion, and framing and choice (eg Kahneman’s 2003 revised
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Much demographic behaviour is about choices made under constraints: to partner, to
reproduce, to migrate, or to achieve well-being (for a pioneering attempt to get
demography to engage with decision-making, see Burch 1980). In making such choices
real people use heuristics or intuitive judgements since ‘rational models are
psychologically unrealistic’ (Kahneman 2003, p1449). This is what Gigerenzer and Todd
(1999; see also 2000 for a lively discussion) term ‘simple heuristics that make us smart’
or ‘fast and frugal decision making’. For demographers this work contains two possibly
interesting attempts to apply simple simulated heuristics to mate search (Todd and Miller
1999; also Todd and Billari 2003) and to parental investment (Davis and Todd 1999): the
simulations rely on simplified evolutionary theory. There is a sharp distinction between
the two approaches to decision making heuristics: Gigerenzer and Todd try to show that
these heuristics work well, whereas Kahneman and Tversky more carefully and
thoroughly demonstrate some of the failings and biases of heuristics in addition to their
power and accuracy (see Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman 2002 and Kahneman 2003).
These developments, far too rich to cover in detail here, have spawned the exciting field
of behavioral economics (Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin 2004; relatedly see Glimcher
2003).
If we are to make real progress in understanding how demographic choices are made, we
shall need to engage with this work. For example, I have already referred to the potential
for taking account of prospect theory concerning greater aversion to losses than the risk
seeking preference for gains (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). It would be fascinating to
explore these domains for partner choice, reproductive choice, and migration decisions.
Another topic worthy of more subtle exploration by demographers is related to
intertemporal choice (Loewenstein, Read and Baumeister 2003). There is clear emerging
evidence of inter-individual differences in ability to postpone gratification or in discount
rates, and thus in time perspectives or decision-making horizons. This is of relevance to
our understanding and assessment of topics as diverse as the economic rationale for
childbearing in developing societies (e.g. Das Gupta 1993, Chapter 12 for a good
summary) or of early childbearing. Understanding the processes involved and the
differences in brain and behaviour for early parents would be useful in this respect and
both risk-taking and intertemporal choice are likely to be relevant.
We also recall the speculations of Rutter (2003) and Hobcraft (2003) about possible
genetic predispositions for risk-taking behaviour and the possible resulting pleiosis
(multiple influences for one gene) for many aspects of reproductive behaviour (early
childbearing, contraceptive failures, sexually transmitted infections, partnership
instability); the possible linkages to (subsequent) disadvantage through job instability and
less informed choices may also be relevant in understanding the consequences of
demographic behaviour. The neuroscientific aspects of risk-taking in this context are
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4.2 Psychology
Psychology is the one discipline that seriously grapples with the range of issues involved
in the programme for population research laid out here. It brings together, sometimes
uneasily, behavioural geneticists, cognitive scientists, and social psychologists and
involves collaboration with geneticists, neuroscientists, and social scientists. Its crucial
concerns include the genome, mind, brain, emotions, decision making, and relationships.
Close attention is paid to the design of studies and these are often rigorous (e.g. Rutter et
al 2001; Plomin et al 2003). A major focus is on trying to elucidate pathways, processes
and mediators. The widespread use of structural equation models forces some conceptual
clarity concerning interlinkages and pathways that matter. There is sometimes a very
constructive concern with trade-offs between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ measurement (the rich
tapestry from small-scale studies and the gruel from large scale surveys). Social sciences
and demography could probably benefit from some of the more rigorous approaches used
in these small-scale studies, where for example double-blind rating of qualitative or
observational material is valuable.
However, there are many features of demographic research styles that could usefully
shape our engagement with the psychology paradigm. Paramount is our interest in whole
populations, rather than psychopathologies. We are already engaged with very different
styles of in-depth studies used by anthropologists and can benefit from enrichment by
both approaches. Our strong empirical tradition permits us to avoid the worst excesses of
theoretical straitjackets that can narrow psychological research (and economics too),
since if you do not look at alternatives you will not find evidence for them (as can happen
for example with specification of gene-environment pathways over the developmental
course where only genes are allowed to exert repeated influence). However, as argued
earlier, we shall not make real progress in understanding demographic behaviour unless
we develop firmer mid-level theories that sort the wheat from the chaff and begin to
specify evidence-based linkages and pathways.
Since we have already extensively considered the need for population research to engage
with behaviour-genetics, with neuroscience, and with interpersonal relationships and tried
to give concrete examples where we already have knowledge, or have enough to explore
further, we shall not dwell on these issues here. Suffice it to say that engagement with
psychologists and with psychological research should be an explicit and high-priority
agenda for real progress to be made in population research.
4.3 Biology
It is also clear that much of the agenda laid out in this paper requires us to engage with
the life sciences and biology. We have much to gain from discovering relevant findings
from genetics, neuroscience, endocrinology, and evolutionary theory and from working
with relevant scholars to make real progress on bringing these areas into demographic
research in a focussed and precise way.Hobcraft 24/1/05 29
Evolutionary thinking, especially evolutionary psychology and evolutionary ecology
have much to say about survival, mating, and reproduction and such thinking has begun
to make a real impact in demography in recent years (e.g. Clarke and Low 2001,
Diamond 1997, Gangestad and Simpson 2000, Low 2000, Gangestad 2003, Worthman
2003, and Kaplan and Lancaster 2003; Haaga 2003). Bringing together evolutionary and
economic (and other) theories about mate choice or reproductive behaviour and
examining their (fairly common) basic assumptions, for example about gender roles,
could ultimately prove quite fruitful (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995, Lam 2003). One of the
great challenges, though, is to formulate many evolutionary theories as testable
propositions and to sort out the enticing speculation from the useful constructs (see
Lickliter and Honeycott (with discussion) 2003, Freese and Powell 1999 and the
comment by Kanazawa and reply 2001, and De Waal 2002).
The value of biology as a paradigm for sociology has received considerable recent
attention.  Lieberson and Lynn (2002) suggest that much of ‘what passes for scientific
sociology is derived from classical physics, a model of natural science that is totally
inappropriate for sociology’. They suggest that a more applicable approach to linking
research and theory would be to adopt several key elements of Darwin’s approach to
evolution. Interestingly, their dismissal of a physics paradigm (presumably mediated
through an economics paradigm) is at variance with the several thoughtful papers by
Burch (2002, 2003a & 2003b) on the potential to learn from how physics is really done.
The key features that Lieberson and Lynn (2002, p1) identify and justify at some length
are: ‘drawing rigorous conclusions based on observational data rather than true
experiments; an ability to absorb enormous amounts of diverse data into a relatively
simple system that did not include a large number of what we think of as independent
variables; the absence of prediction as a standard for evaluating the adequacy of the
theory; and the ability to use a theory that is incomplete in both the evidence that supports
it and in its development.’
The emphasis on a holistic approach or a system not variables is related to, but subtly
different from, the recent emphasis among many psychologists on ‘person-centred’ as
opposed to ‘variable’ approaches to analysis (e.g. Singer 2002 and Bergman et al 2000).
Lieberson and Lynn also make important points about the nature of causal chains, the
role of time (relevant to the ‘stickiness’ of early fertility decline), and the importance of
engaging with other disciplines.
In a different vein, Freese, Li and Wade (2003) provide a very useful review of how work
on several of the topics covered in this paper is of relevance to sociology, including
evolutionary psychology, behavioural genetics, and proximate biomarkers such as
testosterone and serotonin; they also emphasise the likely emergence of an important role
for neuroscience and fMRI in particular. Again this has some potentially useful insights
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4.4. Epidemiology
Demographers have long been engaged with epidemiologists and public health issues.
This, too, is an area that places great emphasis on pathways and processes involved in the
aetiology of disease – a neat term that we might borrow, that avoids too strong an
attribution of causality.
Epidemiology is fairly preoccupied with population-level inferences, though by no means
as strongly as demographers. It is strongly an evidence-based subject area and has
particular strengths (and inherent advantages) in the use of experiments to evaluate
interventions.
A great deal of progress has been made towards implementing the broad paradigmatic
shift emphasised here in the health sciences generally (for a splendid synthesis of the
issues and research agenda see Singer and Ryff 2001) and demographers have been
particularly involved in the burgeoning research on ageing (see Suzman 2004??).
5. Some Implications
I have argued at some length that demography need to be made more pointless by shifting
away from an often too narrow focus on events per se. But, more importantly,
demographic research needs to become much less pointless: focus on the rich tapestry of
pathways, processes, and progressions; tackle the difficult and interesting problems of
why behaviour occurs, rather than undertaking elaborate description; pay more attention
to mid-level theories or frameworks, including judgements on what really (might)
matter(s); look at mediating and protective factors; sharpen understanding of and
distinctions between proximate, distal, and ultimate factors (at least).
One of the key judgements involved in working through the relationships suggested as a
priority for investigation here is how to make real progress: do we move ever further
backwards from demographic behaviour through proximate and then just less proximate
(and so on) factors, or do we begin with the genome and explore forwards? Both are
probably necessary and will undoubtedly often meet in the brain. I would argue that the
forwards exploration may, however get a more effective return in beginning to
understand pathways through exploring genetic markers and their links to behaviour,
informed by animal neuroscience, rather than from fMRI brain scans (largely on grounds
of relative cost).
The broad agenda laid out here implies many shifts in the way that we research
demographic behaviour. The emphasis on pathways necessitates that we collaborate with
geneticists, neuroscientists and psychologists, since we require knowledge about
candidate genes, likely neural pathways, and the underlying physiology and
endocrinology. But it is also important for these disciplines that we collaborate, since the
highly probable importance of environmental factors triggering endocrine responses
among those that can cross the brain-blood barrier, and of interplays and differential
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knowledge of the key contextual linkages too. Moreover, our substantive knowledge
about environmental associations may help in identifying pleiosis. We all have much to
gain from a fruitful collaboration of this kind. Moreover, such connections may help to
move demographic behaviour into greater prominence for neuroscientists, geneticists and
psychologists.
A further implication is the need to significantly improve our theories, measures, and data
sources relating to the individual and contextual areas. This mandates large-scale
prospective panel studies to enable the study of processes. Moreover these studies need a
major cross-disciplinary investment, at least on the scale of the US HRS or ELSA or the
UK Millennium Cohort Study, in order to make real progress in breaking out of narrow
disciplinary silos and reaching some (tentative and revisable) consensus on what really
matters and how to measure complex issues simply enough to make a broad-scale study
workable without losing all content. As those who have been engaged in such cross-
disciplinary endeavours will readily admit, this process is a challenging one, since
individual disciplines always claim (often with some justification) that their topic
requires very detailed measurement (e.g. components of income or personality measures).
But these same researchers come out of the negotiation processes with a much better
understanding of the issues involved and recognise the benefits from meeting the
challenge.
Not only do we need such complex prospective studies, but we also need to make such
studies more sharply focussed on addressing specific questions. We shall never be very
likely to make much headway in understanding reproductive behaviour from ‘omnibus’
generic surveys that try to meet a very broad range of needs, even though quite a bit of
useful work has been done using cohort studies of various kinds. Rather, we need studies
with a clear and explicit design and focus that addresses one issue. An example would be
the US Fragile Families Study (Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan2002), which has drawn a
sample very explicitly focussed on families where the partnership was ‘fragile’ at the
time of the birth of a child. Hobcraft (2002)provides an  example of how we might move
towards a better understanding of reproductive choices.
There are a whole series of design issues that need addressing for these specific studies.
What is the appropriate primary unit of observation: woman, child, or dyad? How do we
follow multiple family members and trace changing circumstances of increasingly
complex parenting? At what levels or groups do we need to obtain information on
interpersonal or structural contexts? How do we avoid sample selection and bias in
genetically informed designs (e.g. adoption studies, sibling studies, twin studies etc)?
Not least among the challenges will be improving (and borrowing from or working with a
range of disciplines’) analytic methods. The challenge of separating choice (or self-
selection) from structures and constraints (or social causation) is an ongoing one (Caspi
2004). Dealing with endogeneity (perhaps an intimate and key part of the process that
cannot simply be controlled away), path-dependence and ‘life-packages’ is difficult.
Better conceptualisation and specification of levels of aggregation and of interplays
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The specification and interpretation of interactions and interplays is also difficult (e.g.
separating passive, active and evocative gene-environment correlations (Plomin 1994)
and gene-environment interactions (Rutter and Silberg 2002)). Prospective or
longitudinal studies are an essential component of this endeavour, but the challenges of
imaginative and informed uses of such information are substantial (see the very
illuminating discussion by Rutter 1994)
We also need to theorise more. The agenda of disentangling the plethora of factors
discussed in this article is truly daunting and cannot be progressed without judicious
simplification. This requires careful evaluation of available evidence and some
innovative and speculative exploration of a variety of potential pathways and processes,
mainly through empirical research but sometimes also through agent-based modelling
approaches (Billari and Prskawetz 2003). As with most scientific endeavours, it will
prove essential to enable several groups to explore the same theme (why do we move or
partner or become parents or even more specific) so as to discover what really matters,
but also to ensure that such large-scale investments are funded as wisely as is possible for
innovative research.
The scale of investment in the human genome project is needed for a human phenome
project too. There is a real need to bring together talented interdisciplinary teams working
on the big issues of human behaviour: demographic behaviour is undoubtedly among
these big issues, since both survival and reproduction (and the search for ecological
niches) are essential elements of evolution (so biologists should need little convincing)
and policy makers in both developed and developing countries are all too aware of the
consequences of human population movement and reproduction.
I am all too aware that the agenda outlined in this paper is a daunting one, which has
profound implications for the way we teach and research. I am also acutely aware that the
broad, but still somewhat diffuse, agenda outlined here requires refining into proposals
for specific projects. There is an evident need for ethical considerations to be part of this
programme. However, I passionately believe that it is essential for population studies to
make a major (paradigm) shift to becoming an integrative science of human demographic
behaviour, engaging along the lines outlined here.
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